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Insurer's Failure to Settle
John L. Heaslip*

WI-HN

ONE PURCHASES

a liability insurance policy he is con-

tracting with the insurer for the insurer to stand in his
place and to pay all liability claims brought against the insured
for which the insured is legally liable. In essence, the risk of
financial loss is transferred from the shoulders of the insured to
those of the insurer, to the extent of the policy limits. The
rights and duties of the parties created by a typical automobile
liability policy are clearly stated in the policy. The insurer
usually incurs the duty:
. . . To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the in-

sured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury and/or property damage.
. . . To defend any suit alleging such bodily injury or property damage and seeking damages . . ., even if any of the

allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent.
But the insurer reserves the right:
.. .To make such investigation and settlement of any claim
or suit as it deems expedient.
The insured agrees:
• . . To cooperate with the company and, upon the com-

pany's request, attend hearings and trials and assist in making settlements, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the
attendance of witnesses and in the conduct of any legal proceedings.
• . . The insured shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or incur
any expense other than for such immediate medical and
surgical relief to others as shall be imperative at the time
of accident.'
These typical agreements preclude the insured from handling any claims or suits brought against him, and place the insurer in complete control and direction of the defense or compromise of suits or claims. But there seems to be universal agreement in all the courts that the insurer may not execute its
* Pre-law education at Rockford College and Fenn College; Third-year
student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School; Claim Adjuster for American
States Insurance Company.
1 American States Automobile Excel Ins. Policy, form 9-ax (Nov. 1959);
30 Ohio Jur. 2d 585 at Sec. 646.
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duties solely as "it deems expedient" for its own welfare. Rather,
the courts recognize a duty on the part of the insurer, in considering settlement offers, to act in such a manner that will display adequate consideration for the interests of the insured.2
Assume that an insurer issues a liability insurance policy
with limits of $5,000 for each person injured, and that the claimant alleges that through the insured's negligence he incurred injuries and claims damages in a suit against the insured in the
amount of $25,000. Prior to trial the claimant offers to settle
the case for $4,500, but the insurer declines to settle. Judgment
is awarded in the claimant-versus-insured suit for $15,000, and
the insured institutes suit against the insurer for the excess judgment of $10,000, claiming that the insurer should be liable for
failure to settle.
In deciding cases of this nature the courts must take into
consideration several issues of law:
1. Is the insurer under any duty to the insured to accept
the compromise offer, and if it is, what is the nature and
the extent of that duty?
2. Must the insured pay the excess judgment in order to
claim any damages?
3. Who, if anyone, besides the insured, can maintain such
an action against the insurer?
Insurer's Duty to Settle
In the earlier cases the courts, in considering this issue, took
the position that the policy was clear and unambiguous; that
just because the insurer reserved the privilege of settling, this
did not place a corresponding duty on him to settle.3 But surely,
in our day, such an attitude cannot be allowed to prevail. It is
true that the policy definitely gives to the insurer the power to
settle as it deems expedient. Yet it would seem that this is so
provided chiefly because the insurer is in a better position to
evaluate the worth of a claim than is the insured. But by what
rational process can it be held to be justifiable for an insurer
to have the absolute right to deliberately abuse this power given
30 Ohio Jur. 2d 593 at Sec. 649 (The rights and duties to settle); 29a Am.
Jur. 556 at Sec. 1444 (Duty to exercise good faith or due care); 40 A. L. R.
2d 170 at Sec. 2. See, Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for
Settlement, 67 Harv. L. R. 1136 (1954).
3 40 A. L. R. 2d 174 at Sec. 3 (Absolute Discretion).
2
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by the insured? As the insurer has the power, through the control of settlement, to adversely affect the insured's interests, it
must necessarily bear a legal responsibility for the proper exercise of that power. 4 As early as 1932, in the landmark case of
American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Cooper, 5 Judge
Bryan of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals made it clear that
the "absolute discretion" theory was no longer acceptable:
• . . It is well settled in cases of limited liability insurance
that the insurer may so conduct itself as to be liable for the
entire judgment recovered against the insured, although that
judgment exceeds the amount of the liability named in the
policy. But the courts that have considered the question are
not in agreement as to the nature and kind of proof which
it is incumbent upon the insured to make in an action against
the insurer for the excess which the insured has been compelled to pay over the amount named in the policy. Some
of the cases hold that the insured is entitled to recover upon
proof that the insurer in refusing to settle a claim for damages covered by the policy was guilty of negligence. Other
decisions impose a heavier burden upon the insured, and
deny recovery unless he can show that the insurer in refusing to make a settlement acted in bad faith.
As of 1955 almost all of the courts passing on the issue held
to the "good faith" doctrine.6 In checking the more recent cases
that doctrine was found still to be the majority view, 7 with a
4 Harris v. Standard Accident and Ins. Co., 191 F. Supp. 538, 540 (D. C.

S. D. N. Y. 1961).
5 61 F. 2d 446, 447 (5th Cir., Ala. 1932).
6 40 A. L. R. 2d 178 (Cases are cited by states following the good faith
doctrine and those following the negligence theory).
7 Hart v. Republic Mutual Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 185, 87 N. E. 2d 347 (1949);
Ross v. Stricker, 85 Ohio App. 56, 88 N. E. 2d 80 (1949); J. Spang Baking
Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 45 Ohio L. Abs. 577, 68 N. E. 2d 122 (1946);
Cleveland Wire Spring Co. v. General Acc. Fire and Life Ass. Corp., Ltd.,
6 Ohio App. 345 (1917); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Parker, 341
S. W. 2d 36 (Ark. 1960); Supra, n. 4; Davey v. Public Natl. Ins. Co., 5 Cal.
Rpt. 488, 188 Cal. App. 2d 387 (1960); Maroney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 12 Wis.
2d 197, 107 N. W. 2d 261 (1961); Radio Taxi Service Inc. v. Lincoln Mutual
Ins. Co., 31 N. J. 299, 157 A. 2d 319 (1959); Bentley v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 289 F. 2d 59 (C. A. Mich. 1961); Bell v. Commercial Ins. Co. of
Newark, N. J., 280 F. 2d 514 (C. A. 3rd Cir. Pa. 1960); American Fidelity
and Cas. Co. v. Nicholis, 173 F. 2d 830 (C. A. 10th Cir. Okla. 1949); McGarry
v. Rhode Island Mutual Ins. Co., 158 A. 2d 156 (R. I. 1960); Peerless Cas.
Co. v. Cole, 121 Vt., 258, 155 A. 2d 866 (1960); Tennessee Farmers Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Wood, 277 F. 2d 21 (C. A. 6th Cir. Tenn. 1960); American Fidelity and Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F. 2d 709 (C. A. 5th Cir. Fla.
1958); Henke v. Iowa Home Mutual Cas. Co., 250 Ia. 1123, 97 N. W. 2d 168
(1959); Boerger v. American Ins. Co. of Minn., 257 Minn. 72, 100 N. W. 2d
(Continued on next page)
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small minority holding to the "strict negligence" theory.8 There
is a substantial minority of cases which seem to say that either
theory is applicable. 9

Good Faith Doctrine
Those states that follow the good faith theory take the position that, as the carrier has the power to accept or reject the
settlement offer, to the possible detriment of both, it stands in a
fiduciary relationship to the insured, with the resulting duties
that grow out of such a relationship. 10 It is not enough to show
that the insurer acted negligently in deciding to litigate rather
than to settle the case, but rather, that it is guilty of bad faith,
which is a species of fraud, that must be proved by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence." Good faith implies honesty,
fair dealing and full revelation, while bad faith implies dishonesty, fraud, and concealment. 12 It is the insurer's duty to
consider, in good faith, the insured's interest as well as its own
when making the decision as to settlement. A recent case pointed
out that:
. . . The insurer must accord the interest of its insured the
same faithful consideration it gives its own interest in
handling the defense of an action: since the interest of one
or the other may be imperiled at the instant of decision, the
fairest method of balancing the interests is for the insurer
to treat the claim as if it alone were liable for the entire
amount.13
(Continued from preceding page)
133 (1959); Fidelity Cas. Co. of N. Y. v. Rabb, 267 F. 2d 473 (C. A. 5th Cir.
Tex. 1959); Prickett v. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co., 282 F. 2d 294 (C. A.
10th Cir. Kan. 1960); Perry v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 359 S. W. 2d 1 (Tenn.
App. 1962).
8 Chancery v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 336 S. W. 2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960); General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Co., 188 F. Supp. 23 (D. C.
E. D. Wis. 1959).
9 Lee v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 184 F. Supp. 634 (D. C. 4th Cir. Md.
1961); Southeastern Fire Ins. Co. v. Hilton, 192 F. Supp. 441 (D. C. S. D.
Ala. 1961); Moore v. Columbia, 174 F. Supp. 566 (D. C. Ill. 1960); Alabama
Farm Bureau Mutual Cas. Ins. Co. Inc. v. Dalrymple, 270 Ala. 119, 116 So.
2d 924 (1959); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Parker, 341 S. W.
2d 36 (Ark. 1960); Canal Ins. Co. of Greenville v. Sturgis, 114 So. 2d 469
(Fla. 1960).
10 American Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Nicholis, 173 F. 2d 830 (10th Cir.
Okla. 1949).
11 Maroney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 12 Wis. 2d 197, 107 N. W. 2d 261 (1961).
12 Davey v. Public National Ins. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 514, 515 (3rd Cir. Pa.
1960).
13 Bell v. Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J., 280 F. 2d 514 (D. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1961).
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A failure to comply with that obligation is generally proved
by evidence largely circumstantial in nature. It is most readily
inferable when the severity of the claimant's injuries is such that
any verdict against the insured is likely to be greatly in excess
of the policy limits, and further when the facts in the case indicate that a defendant's verdict on the issue of liability is doubtful. When these two factors coincide, and the insurer still refuses to settle, the inference of bad faith is strong.' 4 In other
words, the insurer should determine not to settle a claim within
policy limits only on the basis of a bona fide belief that there
is a real likelihood of prevailing in the action. 15 To hold the
contrary would be to sanction a gamble, and it is bad faith to
gamble with the insured's money.' Thus it would appear that
under the good faith doctrine the question to be answered is
whether or not the insurer acted with its own interests too
much in mind, with the result of subordinating the insured's
17
interests to its own.
Negligence Theory
Repeatedly, in reading decisions of courts following the good
faith doctrine, one will hear them say that a liability insurance
company which reserves the right to settle as it deems expedient,
any claim against its insured, is not liable to the insured for mere
negligence in settling or refusing to settle a claim. Thus it appears that under the negligence theory the insurer is placed
under a stricter duty of care for the interests of the insured than
is the case under the good faith doctrine. The test applied under
the negligence theory is that of reasonable care.' s The ultimate
responsibility of an insurer to its insured, in regard to settlement
of a claim, is to exercise such care and diligence as an ordinarily
prudent person would exercise in the management of his own
business. 19 This, of course, does not mean that merely because
14

Harris, supra, n. 4.

15

Id., at 544.

16 Tennessee Farmers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wood, 277 F. 2d 21 (6th Cir. Tenn.
1960).
17 Hart v. Republic Mutual Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 185, 87 N. E. 2d 347 (1949).
18 Augustin v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Co., 188 F. Supp.
23 (D. C. E. D. Wis. 1959), affd. 283 F. 2d 82 (7th Cir. Wis. 1960).
19 Chancery v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 336 S. W. 2d 763 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960).
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the decision of the insurer proved to be wrong that it will become liable.
In Augustin v. General Accident, the court, following the
negligence theory, held the insurer liable because it appeared that
it was negligent in the investigation of the claim, with the result that it was not in a position to make a fair appraisal of the
value of the case. 20 Under the good faith doctrine this negligence
21
or error in judgment does not constitute fraud or bad faith.
Under the good faith doctrine the insured is charged with the
duty of making a reasonable investigation. Negligence in not
doing this is indicative of bad faith, but negligence alone is not
sufficient to render the insurer liable.
Negligence and or Bad Faith
To me the more progressive view seems to be that which requires not only good faith but which also holds the insurer
liable for negligence. This would seem to eliminate the possible
assertion of due care where there was an exercise of bad faith in
a state following the strict negligence theory, and the opposite
claim of negligence but no bad faith in a state following only the
good faith doctrine. In Southern Farm Bureau v. C. H. Parker,
the court said: "It may be negligence to refuse to settle, even
though the negligent person may be acting in good faith. One
may in good faith make an honest mistake which hurts another
and still be liable for negligence in making the mistake even
though no harm was intended." 2 2 In Lee v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co., the insurer was free from negligence but took the
position that the offer was not technically suitable nor to its
23
liking.
Not only does double application of the doctrines close any
possible technical loopholes but it forces the insurer to live up
to the high standards which every insured reasonably expects
when purchasing the policy. It narrows the grounds for grievances between the parties and stems the ever increasing demand
for state control of insurance. Only those insurers who are considered to be undesirable in the industry itself would complain
Augustin, supra, n. 18.
Davey, supra, n. 12.
22 Radio Taxi Service Inc. v. Lincoln Mutual Ins. Co., 31 N. J. 299, 157 A.
2d 319 (1959).
23 Lee v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 286 F. 2d 295 (4th Cir. Md. 1961).
20
21
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of this dual application, for I believe that it is the policy of most
insurers to go beyond the degree of care that is required of them
under the two theories.
Must be an Offer to Settle
It appears settled that, as a prequisite to an action against
the insurer, either an offer to settle within policy limits must
have been made or that there was an indication of such willingness which the insurer declined to pursue. 24 In Moore v. Columbia, a 1960 Illinois case, the court held: "Where there is no
offer by the injured party to settle within limits there can be no
cause of action for bad faith and or negligence." 25 And in Bell
v. Commercial Insurance Co., a Pennsylvania case, the court
ruled that it would be error not to let the question of the insurer's liability go to the jury because there was only an indication that the claimant would settle within the policy limits
26
which was not pursued by the insurer.
This requirement does not take into consideration the cases
where the insurer wrongfully refuses to defend, claiming a policy
defense. In cases of that nature the courts have ruled that the
insurer's wrongful refusal is a breach of the contract and that
the insured is no longer obligated by the insuring agreement.
The carrier loses its right to control the litigation and is liable
27
for any reasonable settlement arrived at in good faith.
Insured's Duty to Pay Excess Judgment
A minority of the courts take the attitude that the insured
must prove either that he has paid the excess judgment or, at
least, that his financial status is such that it is sure to be collected.2 The theory of these cases seems to be that unless such
Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 Harv.
L. R. 1136 (1954).
24

25

174 F..Supp. 566 (D. C. Ill. 1960).

Supra, n. 13.
Minn. Farm Bureau Service Co. v. American Casualty Co. of Reading,
Penna., 167 F. Supp. 315 (D. C. D. Minn. 1958); Neighbours v. Harleysville
Mutual Casualty Co., 169 F. Supp. 368 (D. C. D. Md. 1959); Nixon v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 255 N. C. 106, 120 S.E. 2d 430 (1961).
28 See Keeton article, supra, n. 24 at 1173-75; State Automobile Mutual
Ins. Co. of Columbus, Ohio v. York, 104 F. 2d 730 (4 Cir. N. C. 1939); Duncan v. Lumbermen's Mutual Cas. Co., 91 N. H. 349, 23 A. 2d 325 (1941);
Dumas v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity, 92 N. H. 140, 26 A. 2d 361
(1942); Lee, supra, n. 23; Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Parker, 341 S.W. 2d 36 (Ark. 1960).
26

27
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proof is made there is no proof of pecuniary loss and therefore
there can be no recovery. The majority view is just the oppo29
site, holding that the excess judgment in itself is sufficient.
While the minority view is logical in the abstract, it serves
as a windfall to an insurer fortunate enough to have an insolvent
as its insured. It would seem that in following the minority view
the courts would be encouraging a breach of trust in those cases
where the insured is insolvent, at least the insurer would be less
responsive to its trust than in cases where the insured is able
to discharge any judgment in excess of the policy limits which
may be rendered against him.
Who May Maintain the Action Against the Insurer
The earlier liability insurance contracts were written in the
form of indemnifying agreements, so that the insured had to
satisfy the judgment himself before he could be reimbursed
under the policy. 30 Today, policies make a provision to do away
with this requirement: "any person or organization or the legal
representative thereof who has secured such judgment or written agreement shall thereafter be entitled to recover under this
policy to the extent of the policy limits." 31 However, it will be
noted that this provision allows the claimant himself or the personal representative and the trustee in bankruptcy to bring an
action on the policy, but only to the extent of the policy limits.
What of actions for excess judgments? It is universally agreed
that the claimant is not subrogated to the right of the insured
because of the judgment and cannot bring an action under the
policy for the excess judgment. 32 However, it is agreed that the
trustee in bankruptcy can bring the action against the insurer in
the insured's name. 33 Most states, like Ohio, have a survival
See Keeton article, supra, n. 24, at 1173-75; Southern Fire and Casualty
Co. v. Norrie, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S. W. 2d 785 (1952); Schwartz v.
Norwich Union Indemnity Co., 212 Wis. 593, 250 N. W. 446 (1933); Universal Automobile Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 54 S. W. 2d 1061 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932); Alabama Farm Bureau v. Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple,
270 Ala. 119, 116 So. 2d 924 (1960); Harris, supra, n. 4; Neighbours, supra,
n. 27; Murray v. Mossman, 355 P. 2d 985 (Wash. 1960).
30 Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Starrett, 102 Ga. App. 278, 115 S. E.
2d 641 (1960).
29

31

Supra, n. 1.

40 A. L. R. 2d 168; Canal Ins. Co. of Greenville v. Sturgis, 140 So. 2d 469
(Fla. 1960); Chittick v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 170 F. Supp. 276
(D. C. D. Del. 1958).
33 Byrnes v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of N. Y., 178 F. Supp. 488 (D. C. Wis.
1960); 40 A. L. R. 2d 168.
32
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statute that allows the personal representative to maintain the
34
action against the insured.
Ohio Decisions
An important case reported by the Ohio Supreme Court
involving a suit for excess judgment is the case of Hart v. Republic Mutual Insurance Co., decided on July 20th, 1949. 35 In
this case the trial court charged the jury on both theories, negligence or bad faith. From a verdict for the insured the trial
court granted judgment for the insurer notwithstanding the verdict. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, but the
Supreme Court remanded the case for retrial, pointing out that
the trial court erred in giving instructions on both theories.
The court said:
...A liability insurance company which reserves the right
to settle, as it deems expedient, any claim against its insured
is not liable to the insured for negligence in settling or refusing to settle a claim. But such company is liable to respond in damages to its insured if it fails to act in good
faith with respect to the settlement of such a claim.
In the Hart case the claimant sustained serious injuries and
the liability was questionable. The insurer refused to accept an
offer to settle within policy limits even though it was obvious
that a verdict for the claimant would surely be in excess of the
policy limits. The cumulative effect of these and other circumstances narrated in the record was such as to preclude a holding
that there was no evidence tending to show a lack of good faith
on the part of the insurer. Thus it would appear that the good
faith doctrine is to be applied in Ohio. The Hart case serves as a
guide to show what facts are necessary to constitute a cause of
action.
Conclusion
It would appear that there are four necessary elements to
plead and prove in order to make out a proper cause of action for
the insurer's failure to settle within the limits of the policy:
1. That the claim of the injured party against the insured
arose out of an accident covered by the policy and that it could
have been settled within the limits of the policy.
34

Lee, supra, n. 23.

35

Hart v. Republic Mutual Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 185, 187 N. E. 2d 80 (1949).
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2. That the insured made due demand upon the insurer to
settle said claim within the limits of the policy prior to the trial
of the case, and that the insurer refused or failed to settle.
3. That the insured as a result of the trial was forced to pay
to the injured party the amount over the limits of the policy or
was obligated to pay.
4. That the
settle the claim
when requested
faith, depending

action on the part of the insurer in refusing to
of the claimant within the limits of the policy
to do so by the insured was negligence or bad
on the theory followed by the particular court.3 6

36 For a detailed presentation of the defense (insurance company) views,
well annotated and with forms, see, (pamphlet)

Avoiding Excess Liability,

published by Defense Research Inst., Inc., Syracuse, N. Y. (1962).
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